



Julio Gil Pecharromán: "The pretext. Assassination in Sarajevo". The Adventure of History. Year 2004, no 69, pp. 24-29 (adaptation)

The attempt in Sarajevo was the outlet for the accumulated enormous national tensions. In a continent convulsed for a long time by terrorism from anarchist or nationalist origin, the assassination of the Austrian archdukes made up an outstanding incident, just because it was attributed the nature of *casus helli*

But, apart from this primary cause, what happened after the Sarajevo attempt highlights the importance of other factors such as the inflexibility of the political-military blocks for armed peace, which had replaced the more flexible Bismarckian systems or the growing influence of the warmongering circles, based on uncouth nationalistic speeches, which often hid vital economic interests.

Actually, it was in Germany, where the punitive action against Serbia was decided. Probably the Austro-Hungarian government had not carried it out, without its powerful partner support.

But it is also true that, due mainly to domestic policy causes, the Triple Entente powers added fuel to the bonfire. Especially Russia, where the militarist autocracy tradition and the self-defence reflexes led to a premature general mobilization, which could be presented by Berlin as an aggressive action. The French in charge alleged, after, they did not want the war, but they acted decisively to support Russia.

It appears to be unquestionable that Germany had a direct and immediate responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Nevertheless, we cannot assign Germany the sole responsibility of it.

